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Defendants. 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and Christie, Inc., d/b/a Taco Time ("Taco 
Time"), by and through counsel of record, and hereby submits its Opening Appellant's Brief as 
follows: 
STATEMENT OF T I E  CASE 
i. Nature of the Case: 
Taco Time appeals from summary judgment dismissing its negligence claim based on the 
economic loss rule. The claim arises from an electrical fire at Taco Time's restaurant located in 
Rexburg, Idaho. The electrical fire was caused by a defective neon sign and obsolete transformer 
which failed to comply with the National Electrical Code ("NEC"). The fire caused extensive 
damage to Taco Time's restaurant building, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, other 
contents and personal property located in the building at time of the fire, lost profits, and 
expenses for clean up, repair, replacement, and recoilstruction. Total damages approach 
$300,000.00. 
The neon sign and transformer were installed on the building by Sign Pro of Southeastern 
Idaho, Inc. ("Sign Pro") under a verbal agreement with Taco Time. Importantly, Sign Pro did not 
connect the primary building power to the neon sign and transformer because its employee was 
not a licensed electrician and lacked authority to do so. 
Instead, Defendant-Respondent Leishman Electric, Inc. ("Leishman"), a licensed 
electrical subcontractor, negligently connected final, permanent primary building power to the 
sign and transformer without inspecting or verifying NEC compliance or ensuring it was safe to 
do so. Such connection was the final step necessary to energize that electrical circuit. Leishman 
made the connection while working at the Taco Time restaurant as the electrical subcontractor, 
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hired by the general contractor, under a separate written agreement for extensive remodeling of 
the interior and exterior of the building. 
Taco Time contends the economic loss rule does not apply and the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment exclusively based on it. Taco Time seeks reversal of the summary 
judgment and remand for trial. 
The economic loss rule does not apply where there is property damage to the defective 
chattel itself caused by an accident. casualty event, disaster, or calamitous event. 
The economic loss rule does not apply where other property damage was caused by the 
defective neon sign and transformer, Other property damage includes the building, fixtures, 
equipment, appliances, inventory, and other contents and personal property located in the 
building at the time of the fire. 
The economic loss rule does not apply where econoinic loss is parasitic to other property 
damage. 
The economic loss rule does not apply where there is a "special relationship" which 
sl~ould be recognized here for a licensed electrical contractor, which rendered specialized 
services, and held itself out to the public as a competent quasi-professional. 
In addition, the district court misconstrued and misapplied the economic loss rule to 
completely bar Taco Time's negligence claims finding that the "defective property which was the 
subject of the transaction" was the entire building remodel project merely because the neon sign 
and transformer were a physical part of the building. However, the undisputed facts here 
establish two separate and distinct "transactions": one was the neon sign and transformer 
installation; the other was the extensive building remodel. The district court "intermixed" the 
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two as synonymous or interchangeable. In so doing, the defective neon sign and transformer 
"transaction" was expanded to include the entire building remodel "transaction." The entire 
building thus became the "defective subject which was the subject of the transaction" to 
completely bar any recovery, rather than just the neon sign and transformer which the facts 
clearly evidence. 
In addition, on remand Taco Time seeks reversal of the district court's ruling denying its 
motion to amend its complaint. Amendment is necessary so Taco Time may seek recovery of 
100% of its total damages of nearly $300,000.00. The original complaint mistakenly sought 
recovery of only 50% of the total damages. The mistake was the incorrect assumption that Taco 
Time must give Lelshrnan an offset for settlement monies recovered from Sign Pro. This Court's 
decision in the Sani-Top case and LC. § 6-805(2) direct otherwise. 
Taco Time seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 5 12-121. Given this 
Court's preexisting case law, the economic loss rule clearly does not apply. Leishman's defense 
based thereon was raised without reasonable foundation in fact or law and is frivolous. 
ii. Course of Proceedings Below: 
The course of proceedings below material to this appeal are the following: 
On June 5,2007 Leishman's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed based on the 
economic loss rule and other grounds not material to this appeal. R., Vol. I, pp. 21-22. 
On October 15,2007, after briefing and oral argument, the Court's Memorandum 
Decision issued. R., Vol. I, pp. 98-103. The key holding grantspavtial summary judgment 
based on the economic loss rule stating: 
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"In this Court's view, the subject of the transaction with which Leishman Electric 
was involved was the remodel project including, of necessity, the electrical work 
to supply power to operate the signs acquired aspart of the project. Application 
of the economic loss rule prevents Taco Time's negligence claims seeking loss of 
income as well property damage that was subject of the transaction, i.e.,.the 
remodel project of 1998-1999 [footnote 61. [string citation to Idaho case law 
referring to economic loss rule omitted]. The entire record lead this Court to 
conclude that the economic loss rule bars any negligence claims asserted against 
Leishman, except,for property damage not involved with the remodel project." 
(italics added) 
R., Vol. I, pp. 101-02. 
Taco Time contends the first italicized portion of the above quote is flawed and contrary 
to the undisputed facts establishing two separate and distinct contracts or "transactions," i.e., one 
with Sign Pro to install the defective neon sign and obsolete transformer, and another one with 
the general contractor for the extensive remodel project (who in turn hired Leishman as the 
electrical subcontractor). The district court's flawed reasoning "lumps together" the two separate 
contracts or "transactions." 
Taco Time further contends the second italicized portion of the above quote evidences the 
district court's finding, supported by the undisputed evidence, that other property damage, not 
involved in the remodelproject, existed. Taco Time agrees. The distxict court's first ruling 
acknowledging at least some "other property damage" renders the economic loss rule complelely 
inapplicable as a malter of law. 
On August 12,2008, Taco Time moved for reconsideration of partial summary judgment 
based on the economic loss rule. R., Vol. 11, pp. 285-87. Taco Time also moved to amend its 
Complaint to allege 100% of its damages were recoverable against Leishman, without offset for 
settlement monies recovered from Sign Pro. The decision did not only deny Taco Time's motion 
for reconsideration. It sua sponte enlarged its earlier partial summary judgment ruling, granting 
full summary judgment, despite no motion seeking such relief having been made by Leishman. 
Evidently, the Court was determined to get the case off its docket for whatever reason. See 
Complaint, 77 30-31 (R., Vol. I, p. 14) with proposed First Amended Complaint, 77 27-31 (R., 
Voi. 11, p. 296). 
On September 16,2008 the hearing on Taco Time's motion for reconsideration and 
motion to amend complaint was held. During the argument, the district court candidly confessed 
having "struggled with this, gentlemen, for a least five or six years on this miserable [economic 
loss] rule and when I think I've got it figured out there's a new wrinkle in it and I'm not sure it's 
as easy as you're presenting. It may be. I hope it is. That's what I'm struggling with." The 
court also indicated uncertainty and confusion as to whether the economic loss applied where 
there was other property damage, as it had found in its earlier partial summary judgment 
decision. In response to this argument, the district court responded: " . . . I wish the Supreme 
Court would say that." Tr., pp. 20-22. Taco Time's briefing and oral argument presented the 
case law so holding, but to no avail. 
On October 1,2008 the decision granting full summary judgment based on the economic 
loss rule, and denying Taco Time's motion to amend complaint, was issued. R., Vol. 11, pp. 302- 
04. A Judgment of Dismissal was entered the same date. R., Vol. 11, p. 306. 
Subsequently, the district court awarded $12,500 in costs to Leishman in a final judgment 
entered on November 24, 2008. R., Vol. 11, p. 349. 
Taco Time timely filed this appeal. R., Vol. TI, pp. 342-46, pp. 352-56. 
APPELLANT'S OPENLNG BRIEF - Page 5 
iii. Statement of Material Facts: 
The following facts are either undisputed andlor supported by the evidence viewed most 
favorably to Taco Time as the non-moving party opposing summary judgment: 
Brian Larsen ("Brian") and his wife, Christie Larsen, are the ownerslprincipals of 
Plaintiff, Brian and Christie, Inc., doing business as Taco Time in Rexburg, Idaho. The first 
Affidavit of Brian Larsen ("Larsen Affidavit") explains their involvement and ownership of the 
Taco Time restaurant: 
"1. My name is Brian Larsen. I reside in Rexburg, Idaho. My wife's name is 
Christie Larsen. We are the ownerslprincipals of Plaintiff Brian & Christie, Inc., 
an Idaho corporation, and doing business under the assumed business name of 
"Taco Time" in Rexburg, Idaho (hereinafter "Taco Time Restaurant"). 
* * * 
3. The Taco Time Restaurant has been in existence since 1973 in the present 
location at 274 South 2"* West, Rexburg, Idaho, as a franchise restaurant business. 
4. 1 was employed as the general manager of the Taco Time Restaurant by the 
former owner from approximately I984 to 1990. 
5. In 1990 my wife and I purchased the Taco Time Restaurant and franchise from 
the former owner. 
6. Since 1991, my wife and I have continuously owned, managed, and operated 
the Taco Time Restaurant to date. I am personally involved with general 
operations and management on a day to day basis." 
Larsen Affidavit, 11 1, 3-6 (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 76-77). Brian worked his way up the ladder as a 
fonner employee to eventually become the owner. His is an American "success story." He 
works alongside his employees on a day-to-day basis. He is not an absentee ownerlinvestor 
1. The Building Remodel Contract and Neon Sign 
and Related Transformer Installation Contract 
Are Separate and Distinct L'Transactions9' 
The undisputed facts establish that the building remodel contract and neon sign and 
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related transformer installation contract are separate and distinct transactions. Taco Time made 
the building remodel contract with a general contractor, who in turn hired Leishman as the 
electrical subcontractor. There was no privity of contract directly between Taco Time and 
Leishman.' 
After 25 years of operation, Brian determined that the restaurant building and business 
needed updating and remodeling, which occurred in 1998-1 999 under a remodel contract entered 
with a general contractor. His Affidavit explains: 
"7. In the second half of 1998 and first half of 1999 we extensively remodeled 
the exterior and interior of the Taco Time building. An out-of-state general 
contractor was used which we obtained through contacts with the parent 
franchisor Taco Time company." 
Larsen Affidavit, 7 7 (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 77). 
At the same time as the remodel project was occurring, Brian purchased two neon signs 
and related transformers from a defunct restaurant, and hired Sign Pro, a local neon sign 
company from Idaho Falls, to install them. Again, his Affidavit explains: 
"8. As part of the remodel, two exterior neon signs were purchased from a 
closed Taco Time restaurant located somewhere in Nebraska to put on our Taco 
Time Restaurant in Rexburg. The two neon signs were shipped from out of state 
to Idaho. I arranged for the neon signs to be installed by Defendant Sign Pro of 
Southeast Idaho, Inc. ("Sign Pro"), or by whatever name it had previously gone by 
which included "Sign Pro" in the name." 
Affidavit of Brian Larsen, 7 8 (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 77). 
The building remodel contract, and neon sign and transformer contract, were separate 
'Given such lack of privity between Taco Time and Leishman, the district court's 
statement that "notes Plaintiffs remedies via contract, warranty, etc., are unaffected" by its final 
summary judgment ruling (R., Vol. 11, p. 304) is misleading. The district court was well aware 
that there was no contract or warranty existing between the parties, and no such remedy other 
than one based on negligence. 
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"transactions." Again, his Affidavit explains: 
"8. . . . My contract with Sign Pro was separate from the remodel project contract 
with the general contractor, and I paid them a separate price than I paid to the 
general contractor for the remodel project." 
Affidavit of Brian Larsen, 1 8 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 77) 
Taco Time's Complaint's allegations mirror the facts stated in Larsen's Affidavit with 
regard to the two: 
"6. Sometime in late 1998 and early 1999 the Plaintiff remodeled its Taco Time 
restaurant building located in Rexburg, Idaho ("remodel project"). 
7. Plaintiff hired and contracted with a general contractor not named in this 
action to perform the remodel project, which work was done. 
8. As part of the remodel project, the general contractor hired Leishman Electric 
as the electrical subcontractor to perform the electrical work of the remodel 
project, which work was done. 
9. As part of the remodel project, Plaintiff purchased used exterior neon signs 
from another Taco Time restaurant. 
10. As part of the remodel project, Plaintiff contracted with Sign Pro to inspect, 
repair, and install two neon sign systems and related electrical wiring, 
transformers, and related components onto the building, which work was 
performed." 
Complaint, 171 6-10 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 10). The references "(a)s part of the remodel project" in 
paragraphs 8-10 of the Complaint quoted above are ambiguous and possibly mislead the district 
court into the erroneous factual understanding that the "remodel project" was one "transaction," 
rather than two "transactions" with separate parties as Larsen's Affidavit quoted above clarifies 
beyond all doubt. 
Thus, the undisputed facts set forth above establish hvo separate and distinct contracts or 
"transactions" relating to the remodel project versus the neon sign and transformer installation. 
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2. Leishman Connected the Building Power to the 
Neon Sim And Transfer As The F i a l  Ster, 
~ n e r g i z & ~  The Electrical Circuit Withoui 
Inspecting or Determining It Was Safe To Do So 
The facts are undisputed that Sign Pro installed the neon signs and transformers on the 
building, but did not connect the building power supply to energize the circuit, which was done 
solely by Leishman, as the licensed electrical contractor present. The facts are firther undisputed 
that Leishman did make the final power connection ~liflzout making any effort to inspect the neon 
sign or transformer to determine their condition; whether they complied with the NEC; whether 
they created a fire hazard; or whether they were safe to connect. 
Sign Pro's employee only installed the two neon signs on the sides of the building, and 
related two transformers on the roof. Larsen Affidavit, 7 9 (R., Vol. I, p. 78); Affidavit of 
Michael Packer, r/qi 9-1 1 (R., Vol. 11, pp. 262-63)rPacker Affidavit"). 
Brian did not know who made the final building power connection to the neon signs and 
transformers. Brian Larsen Affidavit, 7 10 (R., Vol. I, p. 78). The answer was supplied in 
discovery by Sign Pro's employee, Michael Packer. His Affidavit states: 
"1 1. I attached the neon glass to the wall and used high voltage wire routed 
through plastic conduit to connect the neon glass to the transformer, but I did not 
make the final connection between the transformer and the primarypower source. 
. . ." (italics added) 
Affidavit of Michael Packer, 7 11 (R., Vol. 11, p. 263). Packer explained why he did not make 
the primary power connection to energize the circuit: 
"14. I was not a licensed electrician, nor was an electrician present who 
supervised or otherwise observed the installation of the neon signs." 
Id. 
Further discovery determined that Scott Leishman, a principal in Leishman Electric, and a 
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long time journeyman electrician, actually made the connection between the building power and 
the transformer which led to the neon sign. He testified in his deposition: 
Did you make the connection between the transformer and the 
building power - or connect the transformer to the building power? 
Yes. 
Did you observe where that - where the line leading downstream from the 
transformer led to? 
No. 
So you don't know whether it went to the Taco Time sign? 
I don't even know that it was hooked up for sure; I can't - to be 
honest with you, I can't - I don't know if that part was completed 
when I put power into that box. 
Was it a part of your original job, a pad of the original project to 
make a connection of the neon sign? 
No. 
How did - I guess why did you make that connection then? 
Mr. Cooper: Object to form. 
I didn't hook anything to a sign. 
(By Mr. Whiting): Why did you make a connection of that 
transformer that you found on the roof to the building power? 
I don't know if the general contractor asked us to or if the owner 
asked us to, I don't know. That's been a long time ago. I don't' 
know which one asked us to, but we were requested to hook up 
power to the junction box there. 
And did you h o w  at the b e  that the junction box was going 
to provide power to the neon sign? 
Yes." (bold emphasis added) 
Deposition of Scott Leishman, p. 14,I. 8 top. 15,l. 7 (R., Vol. I, p. 88). 
Leishman's written discovery response also admits Scott Leishman connected the primary 
building power to the neon sign and transformer in question: 
" . . . Scott Leishman ran power to two junction boxes supplied by Sign Pro and 
connected the junction box transformers to the primary side or line side power. . ." 
Leishman Answer To Interrogatory No. 10 (R., Vol. I, p. 95). 
Scott Leishman further testified that he did not "see" the neon sign in question before 
making the power connection because he "didn't look at that part of it." Deposition of Scott 
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Leishman, p. 15,ll. 8-1 1 (R., Vol. I, p. 88). 
Scott Leishman further testified that he also did not "look" at the transformer to see if it 
was equipped with the secondary ground fault protection safety feature: 
"Q: Did you look at the transformer before you connected it to the 
building power? 
I saw it sitting there. 
Do you know whether or not it had secondary ground fault 
protection? 
No. 
Why don't you know? 
Because I wasn't looking for it. 
Was it contained inside of a junction box? 
Yes. 
Was it possible to open the junction box and look at the 
transformer if you wanted to? 
Yes." 
Deposition of Scott Leishman, p. 16,ll. 10-22 (R., Voi. I, p. 88). 
Bron Leishman is Scott Leishman's brother and also a principal and journeyman 
electrician for over 30 years who worked on the Taco Time remodel project. He also testified: 
"Q: To the best of your knowledge, did anyone from Leishman Electric 
inspect the wiring of the neon sign? 
A: Now we're talking about the neon sign that Sign Pro installed? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No, I don't know that." 
Deposition of Bron Leishman, p. 16,ll. 18-23 (R., Vol. I, p. 93) 
3. The Large Fire Was A Major Accident, 
Casualty, Disaster, Event, or Calamitous Event 
Resulting In Extensive Damage To  he Building, 
Fixtureti, Equipment, Appliances, Inventory, and 
Other Personal Propem and Contents 
The fire was a major accident, casualty event, disaster, or calamitous event, which 
resulted in extensive damages resulting to the building and contents. Larsen's Affidavit states: 
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"1 3. On June 9, 2004, in the late evening hours, there was a major fire at the 
Taco Time Restaurant which caused substantial damage to the building and 
contents and business losses due to inability to operate while repairs were made. 
We could have continued to operate the business without the neon sign, just as we 
did prior to its installation and since the fire, if the building, equipment, fmiture 
and supplies had not also been damaged." 
Affidavit of Brian Larsen, 1 13 (R., Vol. I, pp. 78). 
The Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen Exhibits B an&B (corrected), contain an itemized 
list breaking down I7 different categories and amounts of damages sustained in the fire and total 
approaching the $300,000.00. R., Vol. I, pp. 1 17-18.2 Real and personal property and damages 
sustained include: 
Building of $1 13,208.92 (line item 81 referring to U.S. Bank, which held the mortgage); 
Restaurant and store equipment for $1 1,069.47 (line item #2); 
Lost inventory of $13,796.78 (line item #11); 
Other equipment and expenses of $20,542.32 (line item #15); 
Fire clean up and restoration of $1 1,800.51 plus $10,134.67 (line items #3 and 816); 
Contractor's repairs of $7,228.42 plus $1,451.73 (line items #8 and #lo); 
Major systems replacement or replacement for Culligan of $1,267.23, refrigeration of 
$2,717.50, plumbing and heating for $2,401.00 (line items 86, #7, 812). 
Other listed items include large expenses incurred for cleanup , repairs, replacement, and 
reconstruction. 
Another item lists "lost profit to shareholders" of $75,342.04. Id., line item #5. 
The Second Larsen Affidavit also differentiates between those portions of the original 
building which remained and changes made, as well as new additions made, as part of the 
2 The total amounts are indicated in each document vary slightly due to additional review 
and re-calculation of damages. The changes are reflected in the notes on Exhibit B (corrected). 
Id., p. 1 18. 
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remodel project, with square footage measurements or description provided.) Second Affidavit 
of Brian Larsen, W4-6 (R., Vol. I, pp. 110-1 1). He indicates that the "majority of the fire damage 
was sustained in the original portions of the building." Id ., f /  7 (R., Vol. I, p. 11 1). 
4. The Origin and Cantie of the Fire, and 
Leishman's Negligence, Are Established By Taco 
The's Expert Witnesses 
Taco Time's three (3) expert witnesses' opinion testimony establish the origin and cause 
of the fire, and Leishman's negligence as the licensed electrician which connected the primary 
building power to the defective neon sign and obsolete transformer in violation of the NEC 
without inspecting them and without determining it was safe to do so. 
Robert "Jake" Jacobsen, C.F.I., Bum Pattern Analysis, Salt Lake City, UT, was the fire 
investigator who determined the origin and cause of the fire. His Affidavit includes his fire 
investigation report and related relevant materials. R., Vol. 11, pp. 234-260. Jacobsen's 
Affidavit, qi 6, summarizes the results of his fire investigation as follows: 
" 5 .  Conclla?~ion: All evidence, including my photographs, support the origin of 
the fire within the sign circuits. Arcing and over-heating of the circuits as well as 
the burn patterns all indicate that a failure associated with the electrical 
components was the underlying cause of this fire. All other possible causes were 
carefully considered, explored and eliminated during the scene inspection. Also be 
aware that the investigation was performed with both electrical company 
representatives present. Any suggestion that other potential causes existed are 
refuted by the actual evidence of the investigation, and the reported findings and 
conclusions as set forth in my Preliminary Report, and final December 7,2005 
letter report forwarding Dr. Kimbrough's engineering report to Plaintiffs 
insurer." 
3The Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen was made in response to the Court's first partial 
summary judgment ruling as Taco Time's effort to break out damages which were part of the 
remodel and those which were not in an effort to determine damages which could still be sought 
at trial. The subsequent full summary judgment ruling made this effort moot. 
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R., Vol. 11, p. 243. 
Jacobsen's 8/21/06 letter and photographs, attached as Exhibit C to his Affidavit, further 
explain: 
"With that said, I will further reiterate that the origin of this fire occurred inside 
the parapet wall, slightly above the roof membrane, on the interior surfaces of the 
parapet wall. In proximity to this location were the electrical sign circuitry within 
the conduit that ultimately exited from the exterior surface, to the interior surface, 
and then ran to the transformer. The transformer was positioned on the top of the 
roof. 
* * * 
In this location of erosion, was the signage conduit for the broken letter 'a'. It is 
shown in the photographs and identified by the red arrow in photograph #13. That 
shows the destruction at that location, which is dissimilar to any other position on 
that wall, roof or interior space. The greatest amount of destruction occurred in 
that specific location which is in proximity to the failing point of the Ietter 'a' and 
the conduit that is shown in photographs #13, #76 and #77, revealing the greatest 
degree of oxidation (which is generally an indicator of significant heat) found 
during the entire inspection of the signage materials. 
The evidence is clear, the bum patterns are identified in the photographs and these 
facts are in harmony with the findings of MRA Forensic Sciences' Engineer, Dr. 
Scott Kimbrough. His enclosed report will add additional information to the 
conclusions offered in this clarification letter." 
R., Vol. 11, pp. 254-55. Four color photographs, # 13, #63, it76 and #77, include additional 
written explanation on their face. Id., pp. 257-60. 
Scott Kimbrough, Ph.D., P.E., of Motion Research Associates, Salt Lake City, UT, is an 
electrical engineer which was consulted by Jacobsen to further evaluate the cause of the fire. His 
Affidavit states his expert opinions, and attaches related materials, including his CV and initial 
letter report. R., Vol. 11, pp. 212-33. Kimbrough's Affidavit, 4, states: 
"4. In summary, as indicated in my letter report, the subject neon sign was 
improperly and defectively installed in a manner which violated two (2) 
significant requirements of the National Electrical Code ("NEC"). Specifically, 
nly "Findings" as stated in the report are as follows: 
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' I .  The neon sign in question violated two important requirements 
of the National Electrical Code. 
a. The sign used a transformer that did not have secondary circuit 
ground fault protection. 
b. The sign was not properly grounded. 
Because of these violations, the sign would have presented a significant fire 
hazard.' (Exhibit 3, Report, p. 3)." 
R., Vol. 11, pp. 213-14. Kimbrough's 1212104 letter report is attached to his Affidavit as Exhibit 
3 (R., Vol. 11,227-33). His letter report, at pages 3 and 5, cites the specific NEC provisions at 
600.23 A, B (requiring secondary ground fault protection) and 250.4 A, B (requiring proper 
grounding). Id., pp. 229 and 232.4 
Kimbrough's Affidavit, 71 4-6, quoting from his attached letter report, states further: 
"My report states further in the "Closure" section: 
'The neon sign found in the zone of the most severe damage at the 
fire scene was of faulty design and violated two important safety 
requirements of the National Electrical Code. As it was 
constructed, the subject sign would have presented a significant 
fire hazard. 
* * * 
The defective sign was located in and around the damage zone 
from the fire. That supports the notion that the neon sign caused 
the fire. However, because the current capacity of a neon sign 
transformer is so low, failures from neon signs often do not 
produce clear evidence such as heavy arcing damages, which could 
help pinpoint the exact failure location. Typically, evidence that 
arc tracking has occurred appears as fine etching patterns in 
insulation and wood. Finding the exact failure point of a neon sign 
becomes even harder when the sign h as been engulfed in the 
ensuing fire, such as in this case, because the etching patterns are 
easily burned away. 
4 Copies of the provisions are produced in the Appendix for convenient reference 
obtained froin an available later 2002 edition. 
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To date, this investigator has not been able to find an exact failure 
point, which is not an unusual outcome when analyzing a fire 
damaged neon sign. Therefore, fully implicating the neon sign 
may require showing that all other potential causes have been 
eliminated; which may not be too difficult since the zone of 
damage was limited in extent. This investigator has not been to the 
fire scene, so it will be up to the scene investigator to complete the 
case. (Exhibit 3, Report, p. 6)' 
5. In my review of the scene investigation Preliminary Report by Mr. 
Jacobsen, in the section "Comments, Conclusions & Recommendations," the 
following statement is noted: 
'All potential cause from deliberate human involvement, 
intentional acts or arson were eliminated during the investigation 
While there were numerous electrical circuits routed throughout 
the attic assembly that provided branch circuit supply to lighting 
fixtures, heating appliances and outlets, those components do not 
appear to be involved with the cause of the fire. 
* * * 
All negligent and intentional acts by the insured andlor his 
employees were eliminated during the investigation." (Robert 
"Jake" Jacobsen Affidavit, Exhibit 7, pp. 9-10)' 
6.  Assuming and relying on the accuracy of Mr. Jacobsen's elimination of 
other potential causes of the fire as the scene investigator, it is my expert opinion 
that the cause ofthe,fire was the defective wiring and installation of the subject 
neon sign as explained in my letter report attached and summarized above. There 
is simply no evidence ofother electrical failure in the area of origin o f  thefire 
which has beeiz idenlgfied as a potential cause; and other possible cazises have 
been reasonably eliminated." (italics added) 
R., Vol. 11, pp. 214-15, 
Michael C. Higgins, P.E., of Higgins and Associates, Inc., Morrison, CO, evaluated the 
duty of an electrical cont~actor or electrician which connects the primary building power 
connection to a defective appliance without ascertaining whether it complied with the NEC or 
was safe to do so. His Affidavit stating his expert opinions, and attaching his CV, written report, 
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and deposition testimony excerpts, is also supplied. R., Vol. 11, pp. 143-21 I 
Higgins' Affidavit, 77 2-4, states: 
"2. 1 performed a review of the 1996 National Electrical Code and State of Idaho 
Division of Building Safety Electrical Bureau Licensing Statutes regarding the 
electrical work conducted at the Taco Time Restaurant in Rexburg, Idaho for the 
1998-1999 building remodel at the request of John Goodell, attorney for the 
Plaintiffs in this case. My findings and discussion are stated in my letter report 
dated October 30, 2006. 
Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of my letter report. 
3. In summary, as indicated in my letter report, the electrician who energized the 
neon sign was in violation of the code by failing to inspect the fixture to ensure it 
was wired according to the National Electrical Code ("NEC"). 
4. It is my expert opinion that the electrician was in violation of the Idaho State 
Electrical Code by energizing the neon sign prior to inspecting the fixture for 
compliance with the NEC, and would be legally responsible for damages caused 
by his work." 
R., Vol. 11, p. 143 
Higgins relies in part on the following provision of the Idaho Administrative Code, 
Division of Building Safety, Rules of Electrical Licensing & Registration - General, imposing 
certain "duties" on an "electrical contractor," which provides in part: 
"b. Those duties include assuring that all electrical work substantially complies 
with the National Electrical Code and other electrical installation laws and rules of 
the state, and that proper electrical safety procedures are followed; . . . ." 
IDAPA 07.01 .03.015.01(b).S 
Higgins Affidavit, T/ 5, hrther explains the basis for his expert opinions: 
"My interpretation of the Idaho rules and law governing eleclricians, and the NEC 
which is also adopted governing by Idaho law, and common sense, all support the 
'A highlighted copy of the IDAPA provision relied on is included in the Appendix for 
convenient reference. 
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position that an electrician may hook up andlor energize an electrical circuit when 
he has done whatever is necessary to ensure that such can be done safely. 
r * * 
Thus, unlike a UL-approved and marked appliance situation, in this case a neon 
sign which was not UL-approved or marked was involved, which had been 
installed by someone else, namely, Sign Pro. In such distinct and dzferenl 
situations, and absent UL-approved listing or marking, which was lacking, before 
the neon sign was energized or hooked up to the building power supply, Leishman 
Electric's electrician needed to do whatever was necessary to determine that such 
could he done safely. Obviously, inspecting the neon sign was necessary and 
appropriate, or otherwise verifying that whoever had installed it was licensed, had 
a permit, or that an inspection had been done, none of which occurred. 
Most simply, all Leishman Electric's electrician had to do was look over the 
parapet wall on the roof and examine the wiring, and remove the cover on the 
junction box to verify that the necessary ground fault protection device was 
present, which would have taken about five minutes. Such inspection would have 
readily determined the defective condition of the wiring andor the lack of NEC- 
required ground fault protection device. 
If Leishman Electric's electrician had taken any of these steps to determine that 
the neon sign was safe and in a condition such that the circuit line providing the 
building power could he energized and hooked up safely, he would have been able 
to readily determine that the neon sign was unsafe, presented a fire hazard, and 
that the building power branch circuit line should not be energized. 
Furthermore, since Sign Pro had already installed the neon sign and completed its 
work before Leishman Electric's electrician hooked up and energized the circuit 
line, he was the last person who did the last step in the process by which the 
dangerous condition was finalized, i.e., hooking up and energizing the circuit line 
with the defective neon sign attached at the end. He was the last person who 
could have prevented the fire hazard being created by declining to energize the 
circuit line. He was also the only ZicensedeZec@ician involved in energizing the 
circuit line thereby providing power to the defective sign. Sign Pro's employee, 
Mr. Packer, has testified that he specifically did not provide power to the neon 
sign because he was not a licensed electrician and knew that it was izotproper or 
legal for him to do so. Again, that leaves Leishman Electric's electrician as the 
sole licensed person who subsequently came along and acted to do so." (italics 
original) 
R., Vol. 11, pp. 144-46. 
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Taco Time relies on the above expert witnesses and their respective opinions in 
establishing the origin and cause of the fire; the violations of the NEC; the unsafe conditions 
creating a fire hazard; and the duty and breach of duty by Leishman, as the electrical contractor, 
who admittedly connected the primary building power supply to the defective neon sign and 
obsolete transformer without bothering to inspect or determine whether it was safe to do so. 
Obviously, the subsequent large fire establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that its was not safe 
to do so. Taco Time's substantjal damages sustained in the fire to the building and other 
property, loss of profits, and expenses for clean up, repairs, replacement, and reconstruction 
resulted which its seeks to recover against Leishman in this action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment holding Taco Time's 
negligence claim is barred by the economic loss rule? 
2. Is Taco Time entitled to amend its compIaint and seek recovery of all damages 
against Leishman, without offset for the settlement monies recovered from Sign 
Pro? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Taco Time seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal based on I.C. 5 12-121. 
ARGUMENT 
Taco Time contends the economic loss rule does not apply to bar its negligence claim 
against Leishman as a matter of law for several reasons and the summary judgment based thereon 
should be reversed as legal error. The rule does not apply where there is property damage to the 
defective chattel itself as a result of an accident, casualty event, disaster, or calamity. The rule 
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also does not apply where the negligence or a defective product causes damage to other property. 
The rule does not apply to bar recovery of economic loss which is parasitic to other property 
damage. The mle does not apply where a "special relationship" exists which should be 
recognized here 
The lower court also erred in concluding that the entire building remodel job was the 
"defective property which was the subject of the transaction" for purposes of the economic loss 
rule. Such misconstrues and misapplies the rule. Such is contrary to the undisputed facts 
establishing that the "defective property which was the subject of the transaction" was the neon 
sign and transformer, not the entire building. 
The trial court also erred in denying Taco Time's motion to amend its complaint. If the 
summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded for trial, this Court should also direct the 
district court to allow filing of Taco Time's amended complaint. Taco Time is entitled to seek 
recovery of 100% of if its damages sustained in the fire, without offset for settlement monies 
recovered from Sign Pro. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal of a ruling on a summary judgment motion is property 
stated as follows: 
"In reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court employs the 
same standard used by the district court. SpinMer Irrigation Co. v. John Deere 
Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691,695, 85 P.3d 667,671 (2004). Summary judgment is 
appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' I.R.C.P. 56(c). This 
Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and 
will draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Taw 
Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790,793, 134 P.3d 641,644 (2006)" 
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Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232,234-35, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). 
The Supreme Court exercises free review in determining over questions of law. 
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 188 P.3d 846 (2008), rehearing dismissed. 
Whether the economic loss rule applies to bar any recovery by Taco Time, particularly 
where the facts are undisputed as here, is a question of law. See, Clark v. International 
Harvester, 99 Idaho 326,581 P.2d 784 (1978); Just S, Inc. v. Arrington Consh. Co., 99 Idaho 
462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978); Tusch Enters. v. Cofin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987); Dufin 
v, Idaho Crop Improvenzent Ass'n., 126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d 11.98 (1995); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 
Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1999); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 
(2004); Eliopulos v Knox, 123 Idaho 400,848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992),per. for rev. denied 
( I  993); Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,99 P.3d 1092 (Ct. App. 2004). 
II. TPIE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DOES NOT APPLY 
The economic loss rule does not apply in this case for several reasons 
A. The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Apply When 
An Accident, Casualty Event, Disaster, Or 
Calamitous Event Results In Property Damage 
To The Defective Chattel Itself Or Other 
Property 
The economic loss rule does not apply where an accident, casualty event, disaster, or 
other calamitous event, caused by negligence or a defective product, results in property damage 
to the defective chattel itself, or damage to other property. In such circumstances, general tort 
rules apply which support an action for negligence or strict products liability 
The leading case in Idaho adopting the rule that purely economic losses are not 
recoverable in negligence is Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 
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(1978). Damages for economic loss were described as "costs of repair and replacement of 
defective property which is the subject to the transaction, as well as commercial loss for 
inadequate value and consequential loss of profits." 99 Idaho at 332, note 4, citing Salmon 
Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) 
The Court emphasized several times the narrow economic loss issue presented: 
"In this action the plaintiffs seek to recover only [for] lost profits 
due to alleged 'down time' and the costs of repairing and replacing 
allegedly defective parts [footnote omitted]." 
99 Idaho at 332 
Again, the distinction between purely economic loss versus actual property damage or 
personal injury was emphasized: "The plaintiffs do not seek recovery for property damages or 
personal injury." 99 Idaho at 332, note 4 
Again, just to make sure the reader does not fail to get the point, the Court distinguished 
cases involving actual property damage or personal injury from the pure economic loss issue 
presented in Clark, stating: 
"We first consider the assignment of error No. 4, which concerns the recovery of 
damages for economic loss in a negligence action, because, in our view, that is 
dispositive of the negligence issue. The specific question presented by this 
assignment of error is best demonstrated by distinguishing this case from those of 
our earlier and somewhat related cases. This case is not like Shields v. Morton 
Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674,518 P.2d 857 (1974), in which the plaintiff sought 
damages for economic loss as a result of seeds which were damaged by the 
defendant's chemicals. In the instant case, iheplaintiffs have not alleged that 
their economic losses were the result of any property damage caused by the 
defendants. This case is not like Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 
421 (1 974), in which the plaintiff sought damages for profits lost as a result of 
personal injury." (italics added) 
99 Idaho at 332. 
In Clark, the Court quoted the following passage froin Dean Prosser's treatise with 
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approval in support of the majority ruie which disallows recovery of purely economic loss in a 
products liability action sounding in tort: 
"There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any kind of 
physical harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property damage to 
the defective chattel itse!f as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its 
own bad brakes, as well as damage to any other property in the vicinity. But 
where there is no accident, and no physical damage, and the only loss is a 
pecuniary one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the cost of 
repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule, to be encountered later, that 
purely economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negligence, 
and so have denied the recovery." W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts, 5 
101 at 665 (4th ed. 1971)." (italics added) 
99 Idaho at 333. 
Similarly, in explaining the basis for its holding, the Court in Clark again drew a 
distinction between property damage or personal injury versus economic loss stating: 
"The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a 
tractor that does not harm person or property. If the defendant fails to exercise 
such due care it is ofcourse liable,for the resulting injury to person orproperty as 
well as other losses u~hich naturally,followj?orn that injury. However, the law of 
negligence does not impose on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor 
that plows fast enough and breaks down infrequently enough for Clarlc to make a 
profit in his custom farming business. That is not to say that such a duty could not 
arise by a warranty - express or implied - by agreement of the parties or by 
representations of the defendant [footnote omitted], hut the law of negligence 
imposes no such duty. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting a judgment to 
the plaintiffs on their negligence count." (italics added) 
99 Idaho at 336 
In Clark, the Court held that plaintiffs could not recover in negligence for economic loss 
relating to costs of repairing their tractor which frequently broke down or lost profits resulting 
from "down time." 99 Idaho at 332, 336. There was no accident, casualty event, or calamity. 
There was no personal injury. There was no damage to the chattel itself, i.e., the defective tractor 
at issue. There was no other property damage. Rather, plaintiff alleged only pure "economic 
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In Ciark, the Court noted the legislature's action enacting the Uniform Commercial Code 
to protect the "economic expectations" of the parties to a purchase and sale transaction, declining 
to extend negligence law into such area. 99 Idaho at 336. 
The same "UCC versus tort law" distinction and underlying policies and interests sought 
to be protected, and related distinction between pure ecoilomic loss versus actual property 
damage noted in Clark, were also discussed in the case of Citizens Insurance Co. ofAmerica v 
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F.Supp 133 (West. Dist. Mich. 1992). Citizens insurance is also a 
fire case. The fire was caused by defective machinery in a factory. The similarities are 
instmctive here. 
The court articulated a distinction expressed in terms of "disappointment" versus 
"disaster." A "disappointment" is economic loss for which recovery in tort is not permitted. On 
the other hand, a "disaster" is not an economic loss and recovery in tort is permitted. Citizens 
Insurance, citing Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, h c . ,  439 Mich. 512,486 N.W.2d 12 
(1 992), explains: 
"The Neibarger court thus recognized as critical the distinction between 
'disappointment' and 'disaster.' Id., p. 10, quoting from S. M. Wilson & Co. v. 
Smith int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9'" Cir. 1978). Where economic loss and 
even other property damage is a natural, foreseeable result of the product's defect, 
the 'disappointed' commercial buyer is limited to his contract remedies [citations 
omitted] . . . However, where a product's defect results in a sudden calamitous 
event causing damage to other property, then a 'disaster,' remedial in tort has 
occurred. See, e.g., Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 
(W. Va. 1982)(clock wiring malfunction caused a fire resulting in other property 
damage)." 
802 F.Supp. at 140. In Clark, this Court expressed similar policy considerations in its 
discussion of the UCC and tort law which provide different remedies. 99 Idaho at 334-36 
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The Citizens Insurance court continued: 
"Applying this distinction to the instant case, it is clear that Citizens complains of 
damage that was not only sustained not only by property other than the defective 
product, but that was caused by a sudden calamitous event [footnote 21. Such 
damages are the result not of disappointment with machinery that performed 
unsatisfactorily, but of a disaster, the fire, allegedly caused by the defective 
product. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
and considering, pursuant to Neibarger, 'the underlying policies of tort and 
contract law as well as the nature of the damages,' it appears the losses caused by 
fire damage to property other than the defective product, are of the sort 
traditionally remediable in tort. Even though they are 'economic losses,' in the 
sense that they are assigned monetary values, thy are not the sort usual 
commercial losses that should naturally have been within the parties' contractual 
contemplation and that would therefore be remediable exclusively in contract 
[citation omitted]. They are not the sort of economic losses which 'necessarily 
result from the delivery of a product of poor quality' [quoting Neibarger, at p. I8 
of slip opinion]. Recovery of such losses in tort is not barred by the economic 
loss doctrine." 
The above Citizens Insurance rationale and "disappointment" versus "disaster"distinction 
are fully consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's case law in Clark and its progeny concerning 
the scope and application of the economic loss rule in Idaho. 
In the instant case, the fire is unquestionably an accident or casualty event as 
contemplated by Clark's quote of Dean Prosser stated above. Such a large fire is also clearly a 
"disaster" or "calamitous event" in the terminology of the Citizens Insurance and Neibarger 
courts. Therefore, damages to the defective chattel itself (i.e., the defective sign and 
transformer), and to other property (i.e., the building, equipment, appliances, inventory, other 
personal property and contents, expenses of clean up, repair, etc.), are remediable in negligence. 
Idaho's case law has long so recognized. There is nothing new or novel about it. 
Overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions is to the same effect. For example, in an 
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asbestos case, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected application of the economic loss rule 
and allowed potential recovery for the costs or inspection, testing and removal of the asbestos 
because the plaintiff had alleged and offered proof of other property damage. Kershaw County 
Bd of Educ. v. ~ n i t e d ~ t a t e s  Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1990). The South Carolina 
court explained: 
The sole issue which needs to be addressed here is whether the economic loss rule 
applies when a plaintiff claims and proves "other property damage". We held in 
Kennedy that the rule does not apply where other property damage is proven. 299 
S.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734. In addition, we agree with and adopt the reasoning 
of the recent District Court decision in City ofGreenville v. W. R. Grace & Co., 
640 F.  Supp. 559 (D.S.C. 1986), affd 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987). In W.R. 
Grace, an asbestos case, .the District Court held that the economic loss rule does 
not preclude an action in tort for damages sustained where a defendant's product 
caused damage to other property of the plaintiff. We therefore need only follow 
Kennedy and W.R. Grace in order to dispose of Gypsum's argument here, since 
Kershaw has alleged and offered proof of other property damage. See also Town 
of Hooksett School District v. W.R. Grace &Co., 617 F .  Supp. 126 (D.N.H. 
1984); Cinnaminson Twp. Board of Education v. U S .  Gypsum Co., 552 F.  Supp. 
855 (D.N.J. 1982). Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's refusal of Gypsum's 
motion for a direct verdict on the negligence cause of action. 
Id. at 371 & fn.1. See also, Koch v. Hicks (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig.), 
457 F. Supp. 2d 298,317-318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The economic loss rule, however, does not 
always bar the recovery of economic losses in a negligence case. . . . The economic loss rule 
does not bar plaintiffs' negligence or strict liability claims because plaintiffs have also alleged 
personal injury and property damage.")(Maryland law); Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 
222, 770 N.E.2d 1283 (Mass. 2002) ("It has been a long-standing rule in this Commonwealth, in 
accordance with the majority ofjurisdictions that have considered this issue, that purely 
economic losses are unrecoverable in tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal 
injury or property damage."); Carstens v. Cily ofphoenix, 75 P.3d 1081, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
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2003) ("In Arizona, it is well-established that a homeowner may not recover in tort against a 
contractor for economic losses attributable to defective construction when the negligence has not 
caused personal injury or damage to property other than the defective structure itself."); Hou- 
Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2000) ("Under 
the economic loss rule, economic damages are not recoverable unless they are accompanied by 
actual physical harm to persons or their property."); N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 
Cal. App. 4th 764,777 & fn.8 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1997)YThe economic loss rule has been 
applied to bar a plaintiff's tort recovery of economic damages unless such damages are 
accompanied by some form of physical harm."); American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., 
930 P.2d 11 82, 1 189 (Utah 1996) ("Economic loss is defined as: Damages for inadequate value, 
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without 
any claim of personal injury or damage to other property. . . In other words, economic damages 
are not recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury."); Holloman 
17. D.R. Horton, 524 S.E.2d 790,796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)YThe economic loss rule provides that 
absent personal injury or damage to property other than to the allegedly defective product itself 
an action in negligence does not lie and any such cause of action may be brought only as a 
contract warranty action."). 
The Cilizens Insurance, supra, p. 140, footnote 2, discussed above, describes the damages 
sustained in the fire there: stock loss over $33,000; extra expenses over $1 86,000; building 
damages over $1 02,000; personal property loss over $399,000; and recent extra expense payment 
over $32,000. 
The various itenis of damages sustained by Taco Time in the large building fire are 
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comparable to those damages sustained in the large building fire in the Citizens Insurance case. 
The fire resulted in damage to the defective chattel itself, i.e., the defective neon sign and 
transformer. The fire resulted in substantial damage to other property as well, including the 
building, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, other personal property and contents located 
therein. Such physical property damages exceed $200,000. Such extensive damage to the 
building and other property is inherent in a large building fire such as occurred. 
Even the district court found there was other property damage to parts of the building not 
involved with the remodel project, initially ruling such damages were recoverable and not barred 
by the economic loss rule. R., Vol. I, p. 102. Such finding acknowledging other property 
damage exists necessarily suggests the conclusion that the economic loss rule does not apply at 
all. The district court's "half a loaf" ruling of a "partial bar" evidences a lack of understanding of 
the rule's proper application, or some effort to compromise. On reconsideration, the error was 
pushed even further, ruling the economic loss rule a complete bar. Such legal errors are not 
surprising given the district court's indication of serious confusion and uncertainty with the 
economic loss rule for many years. Tr., p. 20,lI. 17-22. 
B. The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Apply M e r e  
There Is Economic Loss "Parasitic" To Personal 
Injury Or Property Damage 
The district court also failed to acknowledge the parasitic exception to the economic loss 
rule, or why it did not apply, to avoid summary judgment. The district court's failure to address 
it further evidences its lack of understanding of the scope or proper applications of the economic 
loss rule. 
It is well settled in Idaho that "economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an 
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injury to person or property." Duffii? v. Idaho Crop Improvement Assoc., 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 
895 P.2d 1195 (1995); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978); 
C&S Hamilton Hay, LLC, v. CNHAmer., LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13151 (D. Idaho, filed Feb. 
21,2008)(Idaho law applied in diversity case). The effect ofthe "parasitic" loss exception is to 
allow recovery of all damages, including economic loss 
For example, in Just's, Inc. v. Avvington Constv. Co., 99 Idaho 462,583 P.2d 997 (1978), 
the Court explained: 
"This case in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses 
without alleging any attending personal injury or property damage must be 
distinguished from cases involving the recovery of economic losses which are 
parasitic to an injury to person or property. It is welI established that in the latter 
case economic losses are recoverable in a negligence action. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 5 766C, comment b, and illustration 5 (Tent. Draft No. 23, 
1977). See, e.g., Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 51 9 P.2d 421 (1 974)(loss 
of profits resulting from personal injury); Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 
Iddio 674,518 P.2d 857 (1974)(loss of profits resulting from damaged seed 
beans)." 
99 Idaho at 468, note 1 
Thus, where the negligence or a defective product causes injury to person or property, the 
economic loss rule no longer applies, and all damages, including the economic losses, are fully 
recoverable. C&S Hamilton, at 5-9; see also, Clarkv. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 
In Clark, there was no personal injury or other property damage. There was no damage to 
the tractor, which was the alleged defective product itself. Rather, the plaintiff merely 
complained that his tractor didn't operate as efficiently as it should, resulting in lost profits and 
other econornic losses. The plaintiff was merely "disappointed" that the tractor did not perform 
up to his higher expectations. The Court held that the economic loss rule barred recovery in tort. 
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The opposite result is illustrated by the Idaho federal court case in C&S Hamilton Hay, 
LLC v. CMAmerica ,  LLC, 2008 US.  Dist. L E X S  13151 (February 21,2008). The Court held 
that the economic loss rule did not prevent Plaintiff from recovering the full value of a three year 
old quad track tractor even though the tractor was destroyed by fire caused by its own allegedly 
defective design. Applying the parasitic loss rule articulated in Duffin and Presser's explanation 
approved in Clark, the federal court concluded that because the tractor fire also destroyed other 
detachable implements, there was other property damage; therefore all damages were 
recoverable, including the cost of replacement of the defective tractor itself 
Iiere, as discussed above, Taco Time sustained other property damage to the building and 
contents from the large building fire accident. Therefore, its "economic losses" of $75,000+ in 
lost profits and cost of replacement of the defective neon sign and transformer is recoverable 
under the parasitic exception to the economic loss mle. 
C. The "Special Relationsh$" Exception Applies 
Taco Time submits that the "special relationship" exception to the economic loss rule 
applies where Leishman was a licensed electrical contractor; held itself out to the public to have 
special expertise in electrical matters; and was bound by law to follow the NEC in performing its 
electrical work. This appears to be an issue of first impression raised to a licensed quasi- 
professional in this context. 
In Blahd the Court stated: 
"[Aln exception to the economic loss rule is applicable in cases involving a 
'special relationship' between the parties." Dufin v.  Idaho Crop Improvement 
Assoc., 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 11 95, 1201 (1995)(quoting Just's, Inc. v. 
Arrington Constr. Co., Inc,, 99 Idaho 462,470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (1978)). 
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The term "special relationship," . . . refers to those situations where 
the relationship between the parties is such that it would be 
equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there is an 
extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence 
extends its protections to a party's economic interest. 
Dujfin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201. There are only two situations in 
which this Court has found the special relationship exception applies. One 
situation is where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal services. 
McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 97 Idaho 777,780,554 P.2d 955,958 
(1 976). In McAlvain, an insured expressly requested his insurance agent provide 
complete insurance coverage on the insureds business inventory. The insurance 
agent knew or should have known the amount of insurance that was needed to 
completely cover the value of the inventory. A fire destroyed the inventory and the 
insurance coverage was insufficient to cover'the loss. This Court held: 
When an insurance agent performs his services negligently, to the 
insureds injury, he should be held liable for that negligence just as 
would an attorney, architect, engineer, physician or m y  other 
professional who negligently perfoms personal services. 
Id. at 780, 554 P.2d at 958. 
The other situation involving a special relationship is where an entity holds itself 
out to the public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so 
doing, knowingly induces reliance on its performance of that function. Dufin, 126 
Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201." 
Here, Leishman was a licensed electrical contractor. Scott Leishman was a long time 
licensed journeyman electrician. Leishman held itself out to the public as having special 
expertise by reason of its licensing to safely perform electrical work. Leishmm was bound to 
perform electrical work in conformity with the NEC, adopted as the law in Idaho (I.C. $5 54- 
1001 and 54-1 003A), and related licensing rules and regulations (IDAPA 07.01.03.015.01(b)). 
Under these circumstances, recognizing a "special relationship" in furtherance of public 
safety that electrical work is performed safely, and in accordance with such laws and regulations, 
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is well supported by the legal framework and public policy. 
D. The "Defective Property" Which Started The 
Fire Was The Defective Neon Sign and Obsolete 
Transformer, and the L'Transaction" They Were 
the "Subject Of" Was the Contract With Sign 
Pro, Not The Entire Building Remodel Contract 
With The General Contractor 
The undisputed facts establish that the "defective property which was the subject of the 
transaction" is the defective neon sign which lacked proper ground wiring and the obsolete 
transformer which lacked the secondary ground protection safety feature. The undisputed facts 
establish that the neon sign and transformer were the "subject of the transaction" between Taco 
Time and Sign Pro. 
The undisputed facts establish that the neon sign and transformer were part of the 
remodel contract between Taco Time and the general contractor. 
Clearly, two separate and distinct contracts or "transactions" are evidenced, which is 
undisputed. 
Instead of recognizing the two separate and distinct contracts or "transactions," the 
district court in effect "lumps" them together by observing that "the signs were installed as 'part 
of the remodel project.' " R., Vol. I, pp. 100, 101 ; R. Vol., 11, p. 304. 
From this characterization, the district court's first decision concludes that "the economic 
loss rule bars any negligence claims asserted against Leishman Electric, except for property 
damage not involved with the remodel project." R., Vol. I, p. 102. The first ruling partially 
barred Taco Time's claims. 
The district court's expanded ruling in its second decision concludes it was the entire 
"restaurant/building . . . that was the subject of the transaction; and it was the building, its 
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contents, and the profits derived from the building's use that were damaged by the fire. 
Plaintiffs damage claims do not relate to any property 'other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction. . . .' [citations omitted]" (R., Vol. II, p. 304). The latest ruling completely bars Taco 
Time's claims. 
The court appears to have decided that because the neon sign was installed at the same 
time as the building remodel that they were all "transaction" for purposes of the "economic 
loss rule." Clearly, they were not. 
The mere fact that the remodel contract and separate neon sign and transformer 
installation contract were ongoing at the same time does not make them one and the same 
"transaction" for purposes of the economic loss rule. The separate nature of their transactions 
remains unaffected by such temporal consideration. It is also not logical or apparent why two 
separate transactions having different subjects cannot be ongoing at the same time. Clearly, such 
was the case here. 
The building remodel contract and separate and distinct neon sign and transformer 
installation contract were not an "integrated whole" "transaction." The court erred in so 
concluding. Specifically, the court's first decision emphasizes that the "signs were installed as 
'part of the remodel project,' " while also noting "albeit Sign Pro was hired independently to 
actually install the signs." R., Vol. I, p. 101. The court's final decision refers to the "various 
components of the remodeling, including the electrical rewiring, installation of the signs, and 
other building improvements were wholly integrated into the building, not separate or apart from 
it. These improvements were of necessity integrated with the existing building to better facilitate 
the purpose for which the building was used, a restaurant" (italics added)(R., Vol. 11, p. 304). 
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These observations merely state the obvious results of construction when completed. 
Such would be true of any construction project, i.e., there is a complete building. Physically 
incorporating material as part of a building does not identi@ the "transaction" source. The Court 
confuses the physical construction results with the "transaction" which caused the work to be 
done. Clearly these are different matters. 
Thus, the first relevant pestion is: "What is the defective property?" The answer is: 
"The only defective property involved in this case is the neon sign and transformer." 
The next relevant questions is: "What transaction was the defective property the subject 
of?" The answer is: "The agreement between Taco Time and Sign Pro to install the neon sign 
and transformer." It is undisputed that the neon sign and transformer installation was not part of 
the remodel agreement. Scott Leishman Deposition, p. 14, I. 14 to p. 15,l. 4 (R., Vol. I, p. 88); 
Bron Leishman Deposition, p. 12,I. 14 to p. 13,l. 3 (Id., p. 13). If it had been, there would neveI 
have been an agreement made between Taco Time and Sign Pro for its installation. 
The next relevant question is: "Were the neon sign and transformer and the building 
remodel part of a single transaction?" The answer is: "No, they are two separate transactions, 
made at different times, between different parties, having different and distinct subject matters." 
The court's reliance on Tusch Enters. and Blahd to support its flawed "integrated whole" 
reasoning is misplaced. 
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to prepare the area for 
construction. The seller participated in the site preparation, hired a builder to construct a duplex 
on the site and sold the duplex to a buyer. The buyer purchased the building and lot as an 
'integrated whole' then discovered the duplex was damaged because the foundation was 
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defective. The buyer sued the seller and the builderalleging negligence in preparing the 
foundation. The Court held the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims because the 
damage to the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely economic. Tusch Enters., 
1 13 Idaho at 41; see also, Blahd, 141 Idaho at 300. 
In Blahd, the buyers of a house which was settling, causing damage to the house, brought 
suit against several entities, including the developer of the subdivision and two engineering 
firms. Blahds alleged that the subject of the transaction was the improperly filled and compacted 
lot, not the house later constructed on the lot. The defendants argued the house and lot must be 
considered an integrated whole and any damage to the house is purely economic because both the 
house and the lot were the subject of the transaction. The Court agreed stating: "The Blads 
purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole"' I41 Idaho at 301. Further, the court 
concluded this was identical to the situation in Tush Enters., stating: "Like the leveled lot and 
duplex in Tusch Enters., the subject of the transaction in this case is both the lot and the house." 
Id. Thus, damages to the house were purely economic and Blahds' negligence claim was barred 
by the economic loss rule. 
'The "integrated whole" concept as articulated in Tusch Enters. and Blahd dealt with an 
entirely newly built duplex or house, which were then purchased by a buyer as a completed 
project, which suffered damage from settling of the foundation. As such, both the lot and 
building in each case, as an "integrated whole," i.e. a final and complete project, were the 
"subject of the single transaction" for purchase and sale of the property between the parties. 
In addition, the timing of the construction of the duplex andhouse, on their respective 
lots, were done as part of the overall construction of the new and complete residences by the 
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same actors, and before they were sold to the buyers in each case. Thus, from the buyers' 
viewpoint, at the time of purchase, the lot and residences built thereon were at that point an 
"integrated whole." The construction was complete. 
Here, unlike Tusch Enters. and Blahd, the damage to Taco Time's building and property 
were not part of a "transaction" which was an "integrated whole." Here, Plaintiff already owned 
the building. One contract was made with the general contractor for remodeling. A separate 
contract was made with Sign Pro for the neon sign and transformer installation. The instant case 
involves a remodel of an older existing building. The "subject of the transaction" of each 
contract were different. There was no transaction which was an "integrated whole" which 
incorporated both of them. 
Finally, the fact that Leishman performed sewices on the remodel contract and connected 
the primary building power to energize the neon sign and transformer is immaterial. Idaho case 
law rejects determining the "subject of the transaction" based on services provided. 
In Blahd, the Court explained its prior decision in Tusch Enters., stating that the duplex 
was the subject of the transaction, not its construction, although it was the alleged negligent 
leveling of the site which caused the settling and damage to the duplex. 141 Idaho at 300, citing 
its explanation later made in Ramerth v Hart, 133 Idaho at 197. 
Similarly, in Ramerfh v Hart, 133 Idaho 194,983 P.2d 848 (1 999), the Court determined 
that the subject of the transaction was the airplane, not the mechanic's services of inspecting and 
repairing the airplane even though his alleged negligent services were the cause of the damage. 
Where the property determines the subject of the transaction, not the involvement of any 
particular persons or services rendered, the relevant inquiry is thus whether two separate items of 
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property were acquired as an "integrated whole" in one single transaction. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 
300-01. The building remodel contract and neon sign and transformer installation contract were 
clearly distinct and separate transactions, occurring at different times, between different persons, 
not one single transaction. They were not purchased or entered by Taco Time as one single 
transaction. They were not previously completed and existing before Taco Time acquired the 
building. The "integrated whole" concept does not apply. The district court's reliance on such 
concept is misplaced. The case law recognizing the concept does not apply to this case. Rather, 
the correct economic loss analysis identifies the only neon sign and transformer as the defective 
property. Such property was the "subject of '  the "transaction" between Sign Pro and Taco Time. 
Such property was not the "subject of '  any "transaction" between Taco Time and the general 
contractor. The economic loss rule does not apply. 
PIP. TACO TIME IS ENTITLED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT 
TO SEEK RECOVERY OF ITS FULL DAMAGES AGAINST 
LEISHMAN WITHOUT OFFSET FOR SETTLEmNT 
MONIES =COVERED FROM SIGN PRO 
On remand, Taco Time's motion to file the proposed amended complaint should be 
ordered allowed and the district court's prior order denying the amendment reversed. Taco Time 
is entitled to pursue 100% of its damages sustained in the fire against Leishman, without offset 
for settlement monies recovered from Sign Pro. 
Leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires." IRCP 15(a). 
Idaho courts have long held that "in the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal 
grants of leave to amend a con~plaint." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853 (1997); Wickstrom v. 
North Idaho College, 11 1 Idaho 450 (1 986). 
Regarding joint and several liability, I.C. 5 6-803(3) states, in pertinent part: 
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" . . .joint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action listed in 
subsection (5) of this section. . ." 
Idaho Code 5 6-803(5) states: 
"A party shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault of another person or 
entity or for payment of the proportionate share of another party where they were 
acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another 
party. As used in this section, "acting in concert" means pursuing a common plan 
or design which results in the commission of an intentional or reckless tortious 
act." 
Taco Time's original Complaint, 126,  alleged "Sign Pro and Leishman Electric are 
jointly and severally liable" to Taco Time. R., Vol. I, p. 13. This allegation is factually inconect. 
Discovery since conducted clearly establishes that Leishman and Sign Pro were clearly 
not "acting in concert" or as "agent or senrant" for one another. Scott Leishman and Bron 
Leishman each admit in their deposition testimony that they did not "interact with" or "talk to" 
anyone from Sign Pro to communicate or coordinate anything relating to installation of the neon 
signs or connecting them to the primary building power. Scott Leishman Deposition, p. 13,ll. 5- 
6; Bron Leishman Deposition, p. 13,ll. 21-22 (R., Voi. I, pp. 88, 93). No "joint and several 
liability exists. Accordingly, Taco Time should be allowed to file its First Amended Complaint 
to delete the "joint and several liability" allegation. 
Where joint and several liability does not exist, then I.C. § 6-805(2) applies. It provides: 
"A release by the injured person of one (1) or more tortfeasors who are not jointly 
and severally liable to the injured person, whether before or after judgment, does 
not discharge another tortfeasor or reduce the claim against another tortfeasor 
unless the release so provides and the negligence or comparative responsibility of 
the tortfeasor receiving the release is presented to and considered by the finder of 
fact, whether or not the finder of fact apportions responsibility to the tortfeasor 
receiving the release." (italics added) 
In Homer v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,235, 141 P.3d, 1099, 1104 (2006),:onstruing 
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I.C. r) 6-805(2), the Court held that plaintiffs' settlement with one tortfeasor, Home Depot, in no 
way discharged or reduced the claim against any other tortfeasors. It affirmed the district court's 
judgment against Sani-Top without an offset for settlement monies recovered from Home Depot. 
Id. 
Taco Time's original Complaint, 77 30-31, alleges only one-half the total principal 
damages are recoverable against Leishman, with an offset for settlement monies recovered from 
Sign Pro. R., Vol. I, p. 14. Under I.C. r) 6-805(2) and Sani-Top, no offset is owed. Taco Time's 
proposed amended complaint, 727, alleges that the full amount of damages, without offset for 
settlement monies recovered from Sign Pro. R., Vol. 11, p. 296. 
TV. APPELLANT SEEKS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL 
Appellant Taco Time requests this Court's award of attorney fees on appeal based on I.C. 
$ 12-1 21. For reasons discussed above, the economic loss rule clearly does not apply. This 
Court's prior well-settled case law discussed above does not support the econonlic loss defense. 
Leishman's defense and motion for summary judgment based on it is without reasonable 
foundation in law or fact and frivolous. Although the district court was so persuaded, its 
confusion and uncertainty over the economic loss rule is well evidenced. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and entire record herein, Taco Time respectfully requests this 
Court's decision reversing the summary judgment entered below based on the economic loss 
rule, which does not apply, and remanding for trial; reversing the order denying Taco Time leave 
to file its amended complaint and directing that such shall be allowed on remand; and awarding 
Taco Time costs and fees on appeal. 
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Respectfully submitted this 30 -e o f  July 2009. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY. CHARTERED 
By: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and 
Christie, Inc., d/b/a Taco Time 
CERTKFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - a & J u l y ,  2009, I served two (2) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) by regular U.S. Mail: 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 N. 3"l Ave., Ste. 210 
P. 0. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
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IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
*'" THIS DOCUMENT IS CURRENT THROUGH JULY 1,2007 ""* 
IDAPA 07: DIVISION OF BUILDING SAFETY 
TlTLE 01 
CHAPTER 03: RULES OF ELECTRICAL LICENSING AND REGISTRAnON - GEMEW-IL 
DIVISION OF BUILDING SAFETY 
IDAPA 07.01.03.015 (2007) 
015. ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR. 
01, Qualifications for Eiectrkai Contractor. EWective Date: (4-7-91) 
a. .hce.pt as hereinafter provided, any person, partnership, company, firm, association, or corporation 
shall be eligible to apply for an eiectricai contractor'iicense upon the condition that such applimnt shali have a i  ieast 
,one QB) fu!li-3me empioyee who hoids a vaiid master eiectrician iicense or journeyman eiectrician iicense issued by 
&e WeGhc&i Bureau., and has held a vaiid journeyman eiecutcian's iicense fur a periud uf .rlrir iess lhen two (21 
yea& dufing which time he was am~veiy employed as a journeyman eiedrician for a minimum of four thousand 
((4:DDD) hours,, and dho will be responsibie for supervidon of electrical instaiiations made by said cornpany, firm, 
.assodiaBcm, or corporation as provided by Section 5+1OI0, ldaho C&. An individual eiectricai contmctor may act 
as ibis own supenrising journeyman eiectrician upon the condition that he hoids a valid master elecuician license or 
journe$nam electrician iicense issued by the EieWim'l Bureau, and has held a vaiid journeyman eiectilcian's iicense 
for a pe6jod :ofnot less than two (2) yearn, during which time he was actively ampioyed as a journe)rman dectrician 
for a minimum o i  four thousand (4,000) h o u ~ .  The supervising journeyman Aer"Lean shai! b e  available durJng 
,woiking hours to carry out the duties of supervising journeymen, as set Forth herein. EWective Date: (4-5-00) 
b. Those dirties include assuring that all electrical work sub%antialiy com?lies with the National Eiectricai Code 
and other eiectricai instaiiation iaws and ruies d.fne state, and that proper electrical safe- procedures are %lJoi~ied; 
assuring that all electricai labels, permits, and iicenses required to per iom electi~ml work are used; assuilng 
compliance with cornctbn notices issued by the .Bur~au; and any person designate6 under Subsection 015.01.a., 
and She conAmctor he representi, shali each no3:y the Bureau in writing if the supervising joumey.man's.working 
,n'iationship with the contractor has been teminated. Each notice must befiied with the Bureau within ten 110) davs 
Bureau. Eiiective Date: (7-27-94) 
02. Regwired Signatures on Application. An appiication For an eiectricai Contractor iicense shaii be signed by the 
appiicant or by the oiilcial representative o i  the partnership, company, R m ,  association, or corporation making the 
appiication. The appiication shai! be countersigned by the supentising journeyman eTectrician. Eii2ctive Date: (4-1. 
91) 
03. Eiectrical Contracting Work Defined. An eiectrical contractor license issued by the Division of Buiiding Safety 
must be obtained prior to acting or attempting to act as an eiectrical contractor in Idaho. Effective Date: (4-5-00) 
s. Eiectrical contracting work includes eiectilcai maintenance or repair wrk ,  in addition to new electricai 
instaiiations, unless such work is expressiy sxempted by Section 54-1016. Idaho Code. Effective Date: (4-5-00) 
b. Any person or entity providing or offering to provide eiearica! contracting services, including, but not limited 
to, submitting a bid shall be considered as acting or attempting to act as an eiectricai contractor and shall be 
required to be licensed. EWective Date: (4-5-00) 
c. Any person or entity, not otherwise exempt, who perioms or overs to pariom eiectricai contracting work, is 
acting as an eiectricai contractor, whether or not any compensation is received. Effeti~ve Date: (4-5-00) 
04. Previous Revocation. Any appiicant for an electrical contractor iicense who has previously had his eiectrical 
contractor iicense revoked :or cause, as provided by Section 54-1009. Idaho Code shall be considered as unfit and 

Table 250.3 Corzbiu~ed 
- 
I Conductor~quipmeni .Article Section 
i I swnchboards and panelboards Switches 
I / theaters. audtence areas of 
b r  I motion picture and television studios. and similar locations 
I / Transfomers and 
nansformer vaults 
Use and idenriiicauon o i  200 
gounded conductors 
X-ray equipment 660 517.78 
250.4 General Requirements for Grounding m d  
Bonding. The following general requirements identify 
what grounding and bonding of eiecuicd systems g e  re- 
quired to accomp!ish The prescripdve methods coutained 
in Article 250 shall be followed to comply with the pe&- 
maace sequirements of this section. 
(A) Grounded Systems, 
(1) Electrical System Grounding. Elecmcd systems thar 
are grounded shall be connected to earth in a m m e i  that 
will limit the voltage imposed by li~hming, line suigesl or 
unintentioual contact with higher-volrage lines and &at will 
stabilize the voltage to earth duing normal operation. 
(2) Grounding of Electrical Eqnipment. Non-current- 
carving conductive materials enclosing eiectical conduc- 
tors or equipment, or forming pan of such equipment shall 
be connected to ea.rtb so as to limit the voltage to ground on 
these mamids. 
(3) Bonding of Electsical E p i p m e n l  Non-current- 
carrying conductive materials enclosing elecbicd conduc- 
tors or equipment, or forming part of such equipment, shaU 
be connected together and to the electical supply source in 
a manner that estabi'ishes an effective ground-fault current 
path. 
(4) Bonding of ElectricalIy Conductive Materials and 
Other Equipment. Electrically conductive materials that 
are likely to become energized shall be connected togerbes 
and to the elecmcai supply source in a manner that estab- 
lishes an effective giound-fault current path. 
Effective Ground-Fault Current Path. C-lecrrjcal 
eq~iipmen: and wiring and other elecirjcally conductive ma- 
terial likely to become energized shall be installed in a 
nmnner chat creates a permanent low-impedance ciscuit 
capable of safely camzing the inaximum  round-hull cur- 
rent likely to be imposed on it irom auy point on the wirine 
svstem \\,liere a ~j-oiind fault iiia!~ occur ro :be eIecnic31 
supply source. The earin shall not be used a s  the sole equip- 
ment gounding conductor or effective ground-favJt current 
path. 
(B) Ungrounded Systems. 
(1) Grounding Electical Equipment. Non-cunent- 
catqring conductive materials enclosing elechical couduc- 
tors or equipment, or forming pmt of such equipment. shall 
be connected to earth in a manner that will limit the voltage 
imposed by lighming or unintentional contact with higher- 
voltage lines and limit the voltage to ground on these ma- 
terials. 
(2) Bonding of Electrical Equipment. Non-current- 
carrying conductive materia!s enclosing elecksical conduc- 
tors or equipment, or forming part of such equipment, shall 
be connected togeiber and to the supply system giounded 
equipment in a manner that creates a permanent low- 
impedance path for giound-fault current that is capable of 
canying the maximum fault current likely to be imposed on 
it. 
(3) Bonding of Electrically Conductive Materials and 
Other Equipment. Electically conducti\;e materials that 
ase likely to become ener-&ed shall be comected together 
and to the supply system grounded equipment in a mamer 
that creates a permanent, lowimpedance path for gound- 
fault current that is capable of canying the maximum fault 
current likely to be imposed on A. 
(4) Path for Fault Current. Elecmcal equipment w i i g ,  
and other elecaically conductive materid likely to become 
energized shall be installed in a mawm that creates a pei- 
manent, low-impedance circuit from any point on the wir- 
ing system to kbe electrical supply source to facilirate the 
operation of overcurrent devices should a second fault oc- 
cur on the wiring system. The eanh shall not. be used as the 
sole equipment grounding conducror or effective fault- 
current path. 
I FPN No. 1: A second fault thai occurs through the equip- ment enclosures and bonding is considrsed a ground fm~lt. 
FPN No. 2: See Fi'jgore 250.4 for infomiation on the ogaa- 
nization of Article 250. 
150.6 Objectionable Current over Grounding Conduc- 
tors. 
(A)  Arrangement to Prevent Objectionable Current. 
The pounding of electrical sysrems, circuit cond~lctors. 
surge ai~esteis, and conductive tion-cii!~-enf-capiiig mare- 
lials and squipmen: shall be insmiled and ai~anged in a 
inanner thai will prevent ob!ecrionable current 0:'er rbe 
grotinding conductors or roundiilg paths. 
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(C) Adjacent to Combustible Materials. S i p s  and out- 
line lighting systems shall be installed so that adjacent 
combustible materials are not subjected to tempera~ures in 
excess of 90°C (194"Fj. 
The spacing between wood or other combustible mate- 
rials and an incandescent or HID lamp or lampholder shall 
not be less than 50 mm (2 in.). 
(Di Wet Location. Signs and ou the  lighting system 
equipment for wet location use: other than listed watertight 
type, shall be weatherproof and have drain holes, as neces- 
sary, in accordance with the following: 
(1) Drain holes shall not be larger than 13 (!'2 in.) or 
smaller than 5 mm ('A in.). 
(2) Every low point or isolated section of the equipment 
shall have at least one drain hole. 
(3j Drain holes shall be positioned such that there will be 
no external obsmctions. 
600.10 Portable or Mobile Si,m. 
(A) Support. Portable or mobile s i p s  shall be adequately 
supported and readily movable wi-hout the use of tools. 
(%I Attachment Plug. h attachent plug shall be pro- 
vided for each portable or mobile sip. 
(C) Wet or Damp Location. Portable or mobile sips in 
wet or damp locations shdl compi)~ with 60O.l0(C)(l) and 
(Cj(2). 
(1) Cords. All cords shall be jimior hard senrice or hard 
service types as designated in Table 400.4 and have an 
equipment grounding conductor. 
(2) Ground-F5ult Circuit hterrupter. Portable or mobile 
s i p s  shall be pro-vided with factory-installed gound-fault 
cucuit-intempter protection for personnel. The pound- 
fault circnit interrupter shall be an intepal pan of the at- 
tachment plug or shall be located in the power-supply cord 
within 300 mm (12 in.) of the attachment plug. 
iD) Dry Location. Portable or mobile s i p s  in dry loca. 
tions shall meet the following: 
(1) Cords shall be SP-2. SPE-2, SPT-2, or heavier. as des. 
ignated @ Table 400.4. 
(2) Tne cord shall not exceed 4.5 ii? (15 &4 in length 
600.21 Ballasts, Transformers, and Electronic Power 
Supplies. 
1.4) Accesn'bilitg. Ballasts. transformers. and electronic 
power supplies shall be located where accessible and shall 
he securely fastened in place. 
(li) Location. Ballas~s. iru>sfoimeri, and eiecnonic power 
supplies shall be installed as near to the lamps or neon 
mbing as practicable to keep the secondw conductors as 
short as possible. 
(C) Wet Location. Ballasts; msformei-s, and electronic 
power supplies used in wet locauons shall be of the weatb- 
erproof t)~pe or be of the outdoor type and proiected irom 
the weather by placement in a s i p  body or separate enclo- 
sure. 
(D) Workint, Space. A working space at least 900 mm 
(3 ft) lugh? 900 mm (3 ft) wide, by 900 mm (3 ft) deep shall 
be provided at each ballast transformer. and electronic 
power supply or its enclosure where nor installed in a s i p ,  
(E) Attic and SoSt Locations. Ballasts; transformers, and 
electronic power supplies shall be permitted to be located 
in attics and so&&, provided there is an access door at least 
900 mm by 600 mrn (3 ft by 2 ft) and a passageway of at 
least 900 mm (3 ft) hish by 600 mm (2 %) wide with a 
suitable permanent walkway at least 300 mm (12 in.) wide 
extending from the point of entq3 to each component 
@j Suspended Ceilings. Ballasts; transformerr, and 6lec- 
ironic power supplies shall be permitred to be located 
above suspenlsd ceilings; provided their enclosures are se- 
curely fastened in place and nor dependent on the sus- 
pended ceiling giid for suppoli. Ballasts, transfomeis, and 
electrooic power supplies installed in suspended ceilings 
shall not be connected to the brm~ch cucnit by Bexible cord. 
600.22 Ballasts. 
(A) m e .  Ballasts shall be identified for the use and shall 
be listed. 
(B) Thermal Protection. Ballasts shall be thermally pro- 
tected. 
600.23 Transformers and E ~ ~ C ~ O N C  Power Suppiies. 
(A) Qpe. Transformers and elecbonic power si~pplies 
shall be identified for the use aod shall be listed. 
CB) Secondary-Circuit Ground-Fault Protection. Trans- 
formers and elecvonic power supplies other than the fol- 
lowing shall have secondary-circuit ground-fault protec- 
tion: 
( I )  Transfoimers with isolated ungronnded secondaries 
and wirl~ a maximum open circuit voltape of 7500 volts 
or less 
(2) Ti-ansformers w?h integral porcelain or glass secondary 
hoiising for the neon tubing and requilmng no field U~I- 
ing of b e  secondan1 circuit 
I NATIOXAL ZLECTR~CAL CODE ?OD? i i iuon  
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(C) Voltage. Secondary-cil-cuit voltage shall not exceed 
lj.000 volts, nominal. imder any load condition. Tile volt- 
age to gound of ,my output terminals of tile secondary 
circuit shall not exceed 7500 volts, tinder any load condi- 
rloll. 
i?)) Rating. Transjbriners and electronic power s~ipplies 
shall have a secondar)'-circuit current rating o i  nor more 
rhw 300 mh. 
(E'i Secondary Connections. Seconday circuit outputs 
shail not be connected in parallel or in seiies. 
(3 )  Size. Conduit or Cubing shall be a minimum o i  meu% 
designator 16 (made size '/i). 
I (4) Spacing from Ground. Other than ar tile location oi 
connection to a metal enclosure or s i p  body, nournetallii 
conduit or Aexibie nonmetallic conduit shall be spaced nc 
iess than 38 mm (1!/1 in.) from grounded or bonded parc 
when the conduit contains a conductor operating at 100 HZ 
or less and shall be spaced 110 less tban 45 nun (l!4 in.:  
from grounded or bonded p a ~ s  when the conduit contaiirs a 
conductor operaring at more tban 100 Hz. 
II. Field-Installed Skeleton Tubing 
p )  Mark&?. A transfol-mer or power supply sllal! be 
mariced to indicate that it has secondaiy-circuit ground- 
fault protection. 
I (8) Insulation and Size. Conductors shall be insulated. , I 
listed as Gas Tube Sign and ignition Cable Type GTO. j 
rated for 5 ,  10, or 15 kV, not smaller tban 18 AWG, =d i 
(5) Metal Building Parts. Metd parts of a biiildiilg sllail 
not be permiired as a s e c o n d q  rerun? condilcror or an 
equipment conductor, 'I 8 
600.30 Applicability. Part I3 of this article shall apply only / have a minimum temperature raring of l0 j0C (221°F). f 
to field-installed skeleton tubing. These rqnuirements are in 
addition to tbe requirements of Pari i. ( C )  Installation. Conductors shall be installed so h e y  are 
nor subject to physical damage. 
600.31 Neon SecondarpCircuit Conductors, 1000 Volts 0) Bends in Conductors. S h q  bends in insulated con- 
or Less, Nominal. 
ductors shall be avoided. 
(A) Wiring Method. Conductors shall be installed using 
any wiring method included m Chapter 3 suitable for the 
conditions. 
IB) Insulation and Size. Conductors shall be msulated. 
hsted for the purpose. and not smaller than 18 M ' G  
( C )  Number of Conductors in Raceway. The number of 
conductors in a raceway shall be in accordance with Table 
1 of Chapter 9. 
@) Instaliation. Conductors shall be installed so they are 
not subject to physical damage. 
(E) Protection of Leads. Busliings shall be used to protect 
wires passing through an opening in metal. 
600.32 Neon Secondaq Circuit Condnctors, Over 1000 
Volts, Nominal. 
(A) Wiring Iviethods. 
/ (1) Installation. Conductors shall be installed on insuia- 
tors. m nmd inerai conduit. inre~mediate !ne?.d conduit. 1 . . ' 'I' , u p d  non..nerallic conduit. liquidtigl?t flexible nonmerailic 
! conduit. desibie uierd conduit. liquidtight Aexible inetai / conduit, eiecrricl inerallic tubing ineral enclosures. ur 
' other equipment lisred for the guipose and shi! be insralled 
! in :~ccordance with the I-cqiiireii?ents of Ciiaprer 3. 
12) Yumber of !Ionductors. Conduir or rubiiig ;i?ail coii- 
rain 8 ? i l i ~  ,)lie C O ~ U L I C ~ O S .  
(3) Spacing. Secondair1 conductors s h d  be scparared 
from each other md  r om dJ objecrs other than insulators 
or neon tubing by a spacing of not iess than 38 mm (iih 
in.). GTO cable installed in rneral conduit oi Cubing re- 
qui-es no spacing between tbe cable insulation and tbe con- 
duit or mbin~ .  
(I?) Insulators and Bushings. Insulators and bushmi; for 
conductors shall be listed for tbe purpose 
(G) Conductors in Raceways. 
(I) Damp or Wet Locations. In damp or wet locations, the 
insulation on all conductors shail extend no1 less than 
100 mm ("'in.) beyond h e  metal conduit or tubing. 
(2) Dry Locations. in dry locations, the ii~ssiilation on ail 
condiicio~-s hail extend not less than 65 rnm i2'h in.) be- 
yond the metal conduit or tubing. 
iff) Between Neon Tubing and Midpoint Return. Con- 
ductors h a l l  be peimined to rim berween t11e ends of neon 
nibing os to the secondar)~ circuit rnidpoinr return of trans- 
foimers or slecvonic power supplies lisred for the purpose 
'and provided w i t h  ierminais oi- lends ar the midpoint. 
in Dvc'eiling Occupancies. Equipment having an ope11 cir- 
coir volta,ne esceeding I000 ~ o l t s  llall inor be iirstailed i n  
n i  uii diurlling occupancies. 
; 1.n Length of Secondarp Circuit Conductors, 
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